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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

.

MAVOR JEAN CARNES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

.
..

vs.
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CLIFF CARNES,

.

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
INTRODUCTION
The appellant files this brief in response to the brief
filed by the respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ordinarily resort to the record is the best method to
resolve disputes as to the facts of a case and ultimately that
will prove to be the case with this appeal.

However, the re-

spondent's statement of facts contains one glaring inaccuracy
or omission which must be spotlighted because it may affect
the Court's decision.
The respondent contends that in an early hearing in this
matter Judge Taylor of the Third Judicial District ruled that
the respondent could have judgment upon filing "a proof of service," rrom the Florida court file,

(respondent's brief, p.4):.

She then recites that some five months later she did file a
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return and after another month she filed a supplemental affidavit from the same deputy which again purported to show service
upon the appellant.

She concludes by stating that after the

filing of these returns Judge Dee, having no other alternative
under Judge Taylor's order, entered judgment for her.

Respon-

dent has apparently forgotten a crucial state in these prodeedings.
After the respondent filed her return, but before filing
her supplemental affidavit, she again renewed her motion for
judgment.

The Court reviewed the return which was first pre-

pared six months after the Florida hearing, one month after
the action on the resulting judgment was filed in Utah, was
not filed in Florida until one year after the hearing held there
and some two months after Judge Taylor ruled such proof to be
necessary.

The Court concluded at this hearing, which is not

mentioned by respondent, that it would not grant judgment on
the basis of the return alone but would require additional proof.
This is precisely the reason why respondent found it necessary
to file a "supplemental" affidavit, why another hearing was held,
and why appellant was given leave by the Court to file his own
memorandum and affidavit denying he was served.

Thus the issue

framed before the lower court is not merely technical defects
in the return of service but whether, when all the facts are
considered, the appellant was served at all.
ARGUMENT
Three claims made by the respondent warrant a response.
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First, it is contended that the appellant's affidavit was untimely and therefore the lower court did not consider it and
entered judgment accordingly.

Second, if the affidavit was

considered it was legally insufficient.

Finally, it is claimed

that the case is now somehow moot in light of a subsequent decision by the trial court.

Each of these arguments is wholly

without merit.
The claim is made that the appellant's affidavit denying
service was untimely because it was filed six months ater respondent made her motion for judgment on the pleadings.
claim is destroyed, however, by three fatal defects.

The

First,

the respondent never raised the claim of untimeliness in the
lower court.

This Court has frequently ruled that defenses not

raised in the trial court cannot be considered for the first
time on appeal, In Re Jones' Estate, 104 P.2d 210 (Utah 1940);
Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, 604 P.2d 775 (Utah 1980).

The Court

has extended the rule to the issue of "timeliness," refusing
to consider the statutes of limitations or laches when first
raised on appeal, Westerfield v. Coop, 311 P.2d 787 (Utah 1957);
Utah Assets Corporation v. Dooley Bros., 70 P.2d 738 (1937);
and In Re Jones' Estate, supra.

The same rules must be adhered

to in the present case since respondent never raised the issue.
The next defect in the respondent's timeliness claim is
that it ignores the form of her own motion.
began as one for

Respondent's motion

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12
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U.R.C.P.

A counter-affidavit filed at that time would have

been irrelevant since the only issue before the court was the
contents of the pleadings.

An affidavit from the appellant be-

came appropriate only after the respondent filed an affidavit
in support of her own claims on February 16, 1982, thus converting the motion to one for summary judgment.

Within ten days

thereafter the appellant filed his own affidavit.
The final reason the timeliness claim must fail is that
after the respondent "short-noticed" the appellant by giving him
three less days than the mandated ten to respond to her motion,
the lower court specifically gave appellant leave to file such
affidavits as he desired.
The next claim made by respondent is that the appellant's
affidavit is insufficient because it contains the "legal conclusion" he was never served.

This claim is ludicrous.

It is

obvious that the appellant meant "never served" to by synonymous
with "never received."

Appellant clearly stated he never re-

sided at the home the deputy claimed to have served him and when
the deputy changed his story to claim he served him at work,
appellant submitted proof he was not at work that entire week.
The final claim, and the most offensive, is the claim
that this appeal is now moot in some way because the lower court
issued a later ruling permitting the respondent to enforce a
Florida divorce decree in this state.

No authority is cited for

this proposition, the respondent merely resorts to character

-4-
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assassination claiming appellant is a wealthy man who refuses
to pay alimony to his wife.

These allegations are only an

attempt to cloud the issue before the Court, whether service
occurred, and gain sympathy for the respondent to divert the
Court from the truth.

It is sufficient to say that appellant

has affirmative defenses to these charges, defenses the lower
court correctly ruled could not be asserted to the judgment but
could be asserted to the alleged ongoing obligation.

The claims

regarding the actions of the appellant are offensive because the
respondent well knows that owing to the lower court ruling concerning his defenses to the judgment he has no way to defend himself.

However, if respondent is correct in her allegations then

she should not fear having the judgment reversed and giving appel!ant his day in court.
CONCLUSION.
It has been claimed by respondent that mere technicalities
are involved here and thus the judgment below should be sustained.
Those technicalities, service of process and an opportunity to be
heard, are the very foundation for our system of justice.

r

question of service must be returned for a full hearing.

DATED this
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